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\VoRKMEN's COMPENSATION-THIRD-PARTY AcnoNs-EMPLOYER's R.EcovERY ON AN IMPLIED WARRANTY-Plaintiff seeks to recover the amount of
a workmen's compensation award paid to his employee as a result of injuries received when an exhaust valve malfunctioned causing a press which
the employee was operating to double-trip. Defendant, an independent
parts supplier who had sold plaintiff the valve, moved to dismiss the complaint because of insufficiency of evidence to sustain the verdict and plaintiff's legal incapacity to sue. On appeal from an order denying the motion
to dismiss, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. Plaintiff has two independent causes of action, one against the manufacturer on an assigned
negligence theory,1 and another against the supplier for breach of implied
1 N. Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAw § 29 (2) provides: "If such injured employee .•. has
taken compensation under this chapter but has failed to commence action against [a
third party] within the time limited ... , such failure shall operate as an assignment of
the cause of action against such other to . • . the person, association, corporation, or
insurance carrier liable for payment of such compensation.''
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warranty of fitness, the damages in either case to be measured by the
amount of compensation the employer paid to his employee. General
Aniline & Film Corp. v. A. Schrader & Son, 13 App. Div. 2d 359, 215
N.Y.S.2d 861 (1961) (per curiam) .
At common law it was well established that the employer could sue
the supplier of a defective product for his damages on an implied warranty
of fitness. The foreseeable damages included sums which the employer was
legally obligated to pay an injured employee as a result of a suit brought
by the employee against him plus any property damage caused by the
defective product.2 Since the advent of workmen's compensation acts the
employer's main opportunity to recoup the losses directly attributable to
a third party's negligence has been through a subrogation procedure contained in most compensation acts. 3 Generally, this procedure allows an
employer to maintain a lien on any recovery from an action by his employee against the third-party tortfeasor up to the amount of compensation
paid; 4 or under certain conditions, the employer is subrogated to the cause
of action possessed by his employee with which he may pursue the negligent manufacturer. 5 This type of action under the various acts is ex delicto
and not ex contractu as is the case with an implied warranty recovery.
The subrogation procedure is almost exclusively used by an employer in
attempting to recover the amount of compensation paid out under the
act. Thus, the question is raised in the principal case whether an employer can bring an implied warranty of fitness action to recover this same
amount paid to the injured employee under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law.
One of the major factors contributing to confusion in this area is the
great variety of compensation statutes which govern the employer's rights
against third parties. At one extreme, some statutes clearly specify that
any action by an innocent employer against a third party who caused
injury to his employee must be based on the subrogation procedure which
allows only an action for personal injuries. 6 On the other hand, there are
statutes which can be construed as not to restrict the employer's remedy
2 Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901);
London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W.2d 766 (1929), 64 A.L.R.
936; John Wanamaker, New York v. Otis Elevator Co.; 228 N.Y. 192, 126 N.E. 718
(1920).
3 Ohio and West Virginia do not have subrogation clauses.
4 2 LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 71.20 (1952) .
5 Ibid.
6 "Where both employer and employee have elected to come under this act, the
provisions of this act shall be exclusive, and such election shall be held to be a surrender by such employer and such employee . . . of their right to any other method,
form, or kind of compensation, or determination thereof . • . •" MONT. REv. CoDES
ANN. § 92-204 (1947). See WASH. REv. CODE § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1959).
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but to allow recovery on any grounds possessed by the employer.7 Between these approaches range a number of statutes capable of being interpreted to correspond with either view, and the New York act is one of
these. 8 The courts have pursued opposite lines of reasoning in interpreting
the statutes. First, there is a strong desire to prevent the double recovery
against a negligent manufacturer which might result from a personal injury
suit by the employee and an action by the employer for breach of warranty
of fitness. 0 Secondly, the courts find it distasteful to abrogate a commonlaw right when this would result in freeing from liability the supplier who
would otherwise have been held liable, and placing the entire burden on
the innocent employer.10
The principal case attempts to harmonize the subrogated negligence
cause of action with one based on implied warranty. The court feels that
the concern over multiple recovery is easily resolved by proper court
procedures. 11 Another factor which neutralizes the double recovery problem is that section 29 of the New York statute admits the possibility of two
suits for a maximum period of six months. Under the provisions of this
section the employee must bring his action against the negligent third party
no later than one year after the injury occurred or within six months after
claiming compensation, whichever period is shorter. 12 Failure to bring a
timely action bars any action by the employee against a third party. Should
an employer seek to recover on a warranty theory he would find it difficult
to prove the requisite damages until the employee obtained compensation,
and therefore he would be encouraged to withhold his suit until the compensation was awarded. On the other hand, if the employer's suit is brought
7 FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (2) (1961) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23.1101 (1950).
8 N.Y. '\VoRKMEN's COMP. LAW § 29.

o Sec Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Murray v. Dewar,
6 Wis. 2d 411, 94 N.W.2d 635 (1959); United States Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4
N.J. 157, 72 A.2d 190 (1950). See also 2 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 77.10-.20;
McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and
Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TE.XAS L. R.Ev. 389, 450-51 (1959); Comment, 2 STAN. L.
R.Ev. 810 (1950); Comment, 8 WASH.&: LEE L. REv. 124 (1951).
10 See Dayton Power &: Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 287 Fed. 439 (6th
Cir. 1923), 37 A.L.R. 849 (1925); Johnson v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.N.C.
1955); Hyland v. 79 West Monroe Corp., 2 III. App. 2d 83, 118 N.E.2d 636 (1954);
Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight Bros., 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913 (1922) ; Midvale Coal Co.
v. Cardox Corp., 152 Ohio St. 437, 89 N.E.2d 673 (1949). See also Sterling Aluminum
Prods., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d SOI (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 761 (1944)
which denied a contract recovery but only because of an odd historical development of
the death statute and not because the compensation act precluded recovery.
11 Principal case at 364, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
12 N.Y. WoRKMEN's COMP. LAw § 29 (1) provides: "If such injured employee . . •
take or intend to take compensation ••• and desire to bring action against such other
[third party committing the negligence or wrong], such action must be commenced not
later than six months after the awarding of compensation and in any event before the
expiration of one year from the date such action accrues."

390

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

after the employee's cause of action has expired, there is no possibility of
double recovery since only the employer can sue the third party. Although
the possibility of multiple recovery exists for a six-month period after
the employee is compensated, since the employer has a lien on any recovery by the employee to the extent of the compensation award he would
have little to gain in bringing an action himself during this period. In
addition, simple joinder requirements would seem to preclude double recovery even during this period. 13
The majority opinion leaves unanswered, however, the question of the
extent to which the new liability will be enforced since warranty recovery
may expose to liability parties who would not have been liable at common law. This would occur either where the manufacturer-supplier is not
negligent14 or where the manufacturer-supplier is negligent but the employee was contributorily negligent. In the former case, the manufacturersupplier would be liable to the employer for any payments made to the
employee even absent negligence on the manufacturer's part. And since
the workmen's compensation acts oblige the employer to compensate a
larger number of injuries than were compensable at common law, the effect
of the decision in the principal case is to pass on the expanded scope of liability to the manufacturer-supplier. In the contributory negligence situation the employee has no recourse against the negligent third party either
at common law or under the workmen's compensation act. It has been
held that the employer would have to pay the compensation award and
yet not recover in tort since his contributorily negligent employee has no
assignable cause of action. 15 The principal decision clearly seems to allow
the employer to proceed against the manufacturer-supplier ex contractu
and to recover the exact amount of compensation paid. Thus, the nonegligence case would broaden the scope of the common-law coverage
while the contributory negligence case would develop a new area of liability.16 Moreover, the employer now has an additional three years in
13 Section 258 of the New York Civil Practice Act allows joinder of independent
and/or alternative causes of action; §§ 193 and 212 allow the joinder of third parties
if complete relief can be given or if the causes of action stem from the same transaction.
14 In New York there must be privity to allow a recovery for breach of an implied
warranty of fitness; and therefore, without negligence, the employee cannot proceed
against anyone except his emplo.yer. Canter v. American Cyanamid Co., 12 App. Div. 2d
691, 207 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1960) . But cf. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
30 U.S.L. WEEK 2421 (N.Y. Feb. 22, 1962).
15 Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Amsterdam Color Works, 284 App. Div. 376, 131 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1954), afj'd, 308 N.Y. 816, 125 N.E.2d 871 (1955) .
16 The dissent questions this result at 366, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 868, "The plaintiff's
cause of action against the appellant [supplier] is based on contract to recover for sums
spent in compensating the employee for her injuries. The query is-Does an employer
.•. have an action of [his] own, exclusive of the Workmen's Compensation Law, for
recovery of sums paid to an injured employee against a third party on an ex contractu
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which to pursue a supplier after any chance of recovery against the negligent manufacturer has been barred by the New York statute of Iimitations.17 This anomalous result flows from the fact that the employer's
subrogated cause of action, as a personal injury suit, would be limited to
three years,18 while he is allowed six years in which to bring a suit based
on contract.19 It is not clear that the workmen's compensation law was
designed to effect this result.
Philip Sotirofj
theory as distinguished from an ex delicto theory where the third party is one against
whom an action could not be maintained by the employee?"

17 2 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW Yorut PRACTICE 201 (1952).
18 Massi v. Alben Builders, 270 App. Div. 482, 60 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1946),
N.Y. 767, 70 N.E.2d 746.
10

2 CARMODY-WAIT, op. cit. supra note 17, at 200.

afj'd, 296

